countries. The analysis may be of relevance to the design of the Green Climate Fund, which is to be concluded by the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Durban, South Africa, in November/December 2011.
The scientific dimension of vulnerability
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines vulnerability as 'the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes' (IPCC 2007) . None of the research on vulnerability to date has resulted in a systematic and agreed way of assessing, measuring, expressing and comparing the vulnerability of countries to climate change. Three recent peerreviewed articles suggest that this is not due to any of this research being insufficient. The collective conclusion of these three articles is that additional efforts by scientists will not help to overcome any of the barriers to making the term 'particularly vulnerable' operational for the purpose of adaptation funding.
Using a broad range of disaggregated vulnerability indicators for food security, human health, water supply and coastal populations, Füssel (2010) presents a comprehensive semiquantitative analysis of the disparity between countries' responsibility for climate change, their capability to act and assist, and their vulnerability to climate change. He reveals complex and geographically heterogeneous patterns of vulnerability, and argues that the allocation of international adaptation funds to developing countries should be guided by sectorspecific or hazard-specific criteria.
Analysing the possible use of vulnerability indicators for six different purposes, Hinkel (2011) finds that vulnerability indicators are only appropriate for identifying vulnerable people, communities and regions, and then only at relatively large (i.e. local to national) scales, when systems can be narrowly defined and inductive arguments can be built. He concludes that for other purposes, including the allocation of adaptation funds, either vulnerability is not the adequate concept or vulnerability indicators are not the adequate methodology. According to Hinkel (2011) , speaking of 'measuring' vulnerability is particularly misleading, as this is impossible and raises false expectations. Klein (2009) notes that in the absence of an agreed method to measure vulnerability, the many facets to the concept give rise to many possible interpretations of what constitutes 'particularly vulnerable'. He argues that the decision on how to compare potential impacts of climate change on, for example, human life, physical infrastructure and biological diversity eventually requires a subjective judgement as to which expected outcomes are more or less desirable. He concludes that while scientists may well make an important contribution (e.g. by proposing methods and collecting data), negotiators would be misguided to rely on them to develop a definitive, objective and unchallengeable method to rank countries according to their vulnerability to climate change. There is no objectivist 'truth' in vulnerability assessment; any agreed approach will have to be the socially constructed outcome of a negotiation process.
3 The political ambiguity around 'particular vulnerability'
The discussion on linking vulnerability with financial support for adaptation is not new to the UNFCCC. Article 4.4 of the Convention commits developed countries 'to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects'. However, the Convention does not clearly state which countries are particularly vulnerable, or how one should identify these countries.
Vulnerability is first mentioned in the nineteenth preambulary paragraph of the Convention, which presents groups of countries that are considered particularly vulnerable based on their geographical characteristics (UNFCCC 1992: 2): low-lying and other small island countries, countries with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought and desertification, and developing countries with fragile mountainous ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change… Article 4.8 then provides another, partially overlapping listing of groups of developing countries with 'specific needs and concerns', to which Parties shall give full consideration, 'including actions related to funding' (UNFCCC 1992: 8-9 [e]nhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation is urgently required… in developing countries, especially in those that are particularly vulnerable, especially LDCs, SIDS and Africa.
Note the double use of the word 'especially' and the inclusion of all of Africa as being particularly vulnerable (as opposed to 'further taking into account the needs of countries in Africa affected by drought, desertification and floods').
The Cancun Agreements, adopted in December 2010, did succeed in setting up an institutional and financial architecture to support enhanced action on adaptation. In contrast to the Bali Action Plan and the Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Agreements do not specify any groups of countries that are considered particularly vulnerable. The collective commitment by developed countries to provide fast-start funding for adaptation to be 'prioritized for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the LDCs, SIDS and Africa', which was part of the Copenhagen Accord, is only taken note of in the Cancun Agreements. The Copenhagen Accord wording is not repeated under the operative provisions for long-term funding.
In the Cancun Agreements, countries decide that (UNFCCC 2010: 3):
… enhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation is urgently required… in developing country Parties, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable and that funding shall be provided to developing country Parties, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.
Thus, after almost 20 years, the political ambiguity about the meaning of 'particularly vulnerable' is as great as ever. It is difficult to see how future negotiations could change this situation. One of the objectives of the GCCA, which was established by the European Commission (EC) in 2007, is to enhance support for adaptation to poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate change. The selection of beneficiary countries has been guided by the Bali Action Plan. As such, the primary target groups of the GCCA are LDCs and SIDS, based on the assumption that these are the countries that are most vulnerable and have the least resources, both human and financial, to address those challenges (EC 2007) . Additional criteria were applied to select countries among the LDCs and SIDS, including the existence of national and/or sectoral climate change policies; a keenness to enhance policy dialogue and cooperation on climate change with the European Union and a strong involvement under the UNFCCC; and the presence of an EC Delegation with sufficient capacity to prepare and follow-up implementation of the GCCA programme. As of January 2011, 17 countries and one regional group have received support. 2 The GCCA has not set up a new fund or governance structure but works through established channels of European official development assistance (ODA).
The PPCR, which was set up under the World Bank's Climate Investment Funds in 2008, seeks 'to pilot and demonstrate ways to integrate climate risk and resilience into core development planning'. Priority is to be given to highly vulnerable LDCs, including the SIDS among them (CIF 2008a; Seballos and Kreft, this IDS Bulletin) . An expert group was established to inform the selection of countries. According to its terms of reference, the expert group was to take into account 'country vulnerability' and 'country eligibility' as the first-order selection criteria when recommending countries (CIF 2008b) . For each of these criteria, Table 1 presents a list of issues that were to be considered by the expert group.
As its own report, CIF (2009) suggests, the expert group's approach to country selection focused on climate risks (i.e. the first issue under the vulnerability criterion). The group employed a two-stage risk assessment process. The first step involved the identification of vulnerable regions, based on a combination of climate projections from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (Christensen et al. 2007 ) and expert judgement. The second step involved screening countries within these regions on the basis of vulnerability as represented by a number of indicators. Countries thus defined as potentially 'high risk' were then subject to further analysis, taking into account second and third-order criteria, such as country preparedness, geographical distribution and value added (see Shankland and Chambote; Seballos and Kreft; Ayers et al. all in this IDS Bulletin). The expert group recommended seven countries and three regional groups to participate in the PPCR. As of January 2011, programmes for nine countries and two regions have been established. Bangladesh, Niger and Tajikistan were the first countries to receive a US$50 million grant each. 5 Prioritising adaptation funding on the basis of vulnerability: Implementation
As shown above, the GCCA, the PPCR and the Adaptation Fund have all been designed to make decisions on country prioritisation and the allocation of funds based on an understanding of developing countries' level of vulnerability. However, there are marked differences amongst the three funding avenues in the way vulnerability has informed such decisions. The GCCA has applied a category approach to vulnerability in determining eligibility: only LDCs and SIDS -categorised as the most vulnerable -are eligible for funding. The PPCR expert group applied a more sophisticated category approach: based on a first screening of climate risks it identified nine vulnerable regions, and only countries belonging to these nine regions were then considered eligible and subject to further analysis. African LDCs were then added as a tenth group of vulnerable countries to avoid underrepresentation of African countries. The expert group itself acknowledged shortcomings to its selection approach (CIF 2009: 34) :
It must be recognised that countries not identified using this methodology may also face considerable climate change risks associated with more subtle and complex interactions between hazard and vulnerability than are represented by the broad risk assessment employed here. In particular, very poor countries with low capacities to respond and adapt to climate change hazards and extremes may be at high risk as a result of their underlying systemic vulnerability. This is likely to be particularly true of LDCs, the majority of which are located in Africa. Many African countries not selected in this analysis may well be more vulnerable than countries selected from other geographical regions.
In contrast to the category approach to vulnerability of the GCCA and the PPCR, the Adaptation Fund does not have a predefined set of developing countries from which it can choose. Its Operational Policies and Guidelines (AFB 2009) do not provide additional guidance to make the notion of particular vulnerability operational beyond what was agreed in the Strategic Policies and Guidelines. An invitation letter to submit project and programme proposals was sent to all Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are Non-Annexe I Parties to the Convention, which implies that these are the eligible Parties (AFB 2010a). Nonetheless, when submitting a proposal countries also have to declare themselves particularly vulnerable and thus eligible. So far, funding has been provided on a first come, first served basis, provided that project proposals complied with the guidelines. None of the rejected proposals has been rejected for not demonstrating particular vulnerability.
The three funding avenues have used different approaches in letting countries' level of vulnerability guide the amount of funding allocated. In the case of the GCCA, amounts differ amongst countries: Ethiopia has received ¤13 million, while the Solomon Islands have received ¤2 million. However, information publicly available suggests that the allocated amounts are at least in part also determined by factors other than the climate vulnerability of each recipient, such as absorptive capacity. In the case of the PPCR, each recipient country was allocated US$1.5 million for preparing a Strategic Program for Climate Resilience (SPCR). The PPCR's governing committee agreed in June 2010 that 'for each of the nine PPCR pilot countries, a range of US$40-50 million may be programmed per SPCR and for PPCR regional pilot programs, a range of US$60-75 million may be programmed per regional pilot' (CIF 2010: 4) . Each of the three countries that has received funding so far was allocated the maximum possible grant funding, i.e. US$50 million. The committee further agreed that 'no new pilot programs will be considered at this time' (CIF 2010: 5), thus restricting this equitable treatment to the current PPCR membership.
The Adaptation Fund Board has not yet agreed on allocating amounts based on the level of vulnerability, but it has begun to discuss the possibility of assigning allocation caps for eligible countries. Options under discussion include a uniform cap per country (i.e. no differentiation based on the level of vulnerability) and variable caps. Two types of variable caps are discussed: one providing extra resources to countries belonging to a specific vulnerability category (LDCs, SIDS or Africa), and a second one in which resource allocations are determined individually for each country, based on a numerical combination of indices (AFB 2010a). The Adaptation Fund Board has deferred further discussions on allocation caps to March 2011 and further discussion on vulnerability to June 2011 (AFB 2010b).
Relevance to the Green Climate Fund
Considering the above experience with the GCCA, the PPCR and the Adaptation Fund, the Green Climate Fund appears to have three options for 'taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable':
1 Prioritisation and allocation of funds based on quantified levels of vulnerability measured through indices; Given these scientific and political challenges, Option 3 appears to be the most feasible. In this option, the question of which countries can be considered to be particularly vulnerable would not be addressed by the Green Climate Fund, but by the countries themselves, as currently practised by the Adaptation Fund (see Section 4). In requesting funding, developing countries would elaborate on their particular vulnerability in their proposals, and in line with the Cancun Adaptation Framework the proposed adaptation action would take into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems.
On a final note, if sufficient adaptation finance were available for each developing country, then the need to prioritise among countries would become less pertinent. Designers and decisionmakers of the Green Climate Fund may therefore wish to prioritise the mobilisation of the agreed resources, rather than risk paralysis in the negotiations over a seemingly simple question that has only very complicated answers, none of which will satisfy everybody. 
